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Abstract
In this extended abstract we summarize our consult-
ing work, scientific research, and activism in the topic of
electronic (computer-based) voting. The Dutch and Irish
government’s activities are our particular focus, as is the
Kiezen op Afstand (KOA) system, an experimental platform
for electronic voting research with formal methods. We also
reflect on the current state of affairs in The Netherlands and
Ireland, and discuss next research steps in trustworthy, ver-
ified electronic voting systems.
1. Introduction
The Netherlands is known for its forward-thinking and
progressive government, laws, and policies and has used
computers in voting for over a decade. It is our percep-
tion that the current Irish government wants to be a pro-
gressive, “modern” government, thus it has recently aggres-
sively attempted to adopt the use of electronic voting ma-
chines. Unfortunately, a government’s progressiveness, par-
ticularly with respect to the adoption of new technology, is
sometimes counter to the good of its citizens.
Two research groups have been directly involved in the
evaluation and development of voting systems in their re-
spective countries over the past five years. The Security of
Systems (SoS) Group at the Radboud University Nijmegen,
led by Professor Bart Jacobs, and in which Dr. Joe Kiniry
was a key member, has been involved in the evaluation and
development of several voting systems in The Netherlands
and, recently in the development of a voting system for the
Scottish government. The KindSoftware Research Group at
University College Dublin, led by Dr. Joe Kiniry, has been
involved in the evolution of a Dutch remote voting platform
as well as, as a scientist activist, in evaluation, and the fight
against the adoption of, voting computers in Ireland.
In this paper, we first summarize our scientific and ac-
tivist work in computer-based voting. Next, the major tech-
nical and sociological flaws of existing system designs, im-
plementations, and protocols are discussed. Finally, we
present KOAv2, a new Open Source platform for experi-
mentation in computer-based voting and highlight ongoing
work and open problems in trusted, trustworthy electronic
voting.
2. Voting Computers in The Netherlands
Electronic voting machines (EVMs), whose primary
supplier in The Netherlands is Nedap/Groenendaal, were
introduced without controversy in Holland around 1998.
They have been widely used in local and national elec-
tions ever since. Ninety percent of the votes in The Nether-
lands are cast on the Nedap/Groenendaal ES3B voting com-
puter [6].
Part of the reason that EVMs were so readily accepted
and recently used, for example, for the European general
elections in June 2004, is historical. The Netherlands has
used digital voting machines (the previous-generation sys-
tems with little-to-no software) since the 1980s, and there
was very little contrary discussion to such in the media or
government for many years. Therefore, Dutch citizens were
comfortable with the idea of using technology for voting.
This individual and collective comfort-level meant that the
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security and reliability issues of the new generation of ma-
chines was not raised at the time of their introduction, unlike
the furor witnessed during their adoption by other govern-
ments in the late 1990s.
But new systems were radically more complex than pre-
vious generation machines. And unfortunately, many as-
pects of these systems were not made public, contrary to the
requests of concerned parties in The Netherlands. The in-
ternals of such systems are secret and are only (purportedly)
exposed to evaluators. Each system (a particular version of
hardware and software in combination), under a strict non-
disclosure agreement, must be evaluated, according to an
unknown set of criteria, before being accepted by the Dutch
parliament for use in elections. The main national evalu-
ator is a commercial organization called TNO. Evaluation
reports are secret as well.
As attention has focused the world-over on EVMs, par-
ticularly beginning around 2002, the Dutch parliament be-
gan to reevaluate their use. The SoS Group was involved
in some of these evaluations, as discussed in the sequel.
The main result of such evaluations was the (very com-
mon) suggestion that voter verifiable (paper) trails be used
in computer-based voting in The Netherlands.
The Dutch parliament began conducting experiments in
2004 with the “natural” next technological step in the use
of technology for voting: remote, Internet-based voting. An
usual, the general thought of government officials seemed
to be: many complex activities can be accomplished from
home these days (e.g., banking, buying airline tickets, etc.),
so why not voting? It was generally believed that such a
system would increase voter participation because voting is
relatively inconvenient for some today. Currently, Dutch
citizens must take time off of work to vote because polls
are open only during extended business hours (8am to 8pm)
for a single day of the work-week, and furthermore each
individual must vote in a particular location near their home,
which is sometimes far from their workplace.
The question is, given what we know about unreliabil-
ity and vulnerability of software and networks, do the risks
inherent in the introduction of such a system outweigh the
benefits?
3. Remote Voting in The Netherlands
European Elections of June 2004 permitted “Remote
Voting” or, literally translated, “Kiezen op Afstand” (KOA)
via the Internet and telephone. Remote voting was not
broadly deployed nationwide. Instead, remote voting was
intended only for expatriates, and only after explicit regis-
tration. It was thought that such a smaller-scale use (thou-
sands of voters) would provide a useful real-world test for
remote voting, with the intention of possibility adopting the
technology nationwide in the near future.
Internet-based solution became an option for adoption
for a decidedly non-technical reason. The reason, at its
core, was that by significantly constraining the remote vot-
ing problem, particularly with respect to the registration and
voting process itself, a secure and reliable system might be
constructed. This process, a complex protocol, includes not
just the standard elements of protocols in computer science,
(computers, networks, databases, cryptography algorithms,
etc.), but also people (the voter, government officials, etc.)
and organizations (the city hall, political parties, etc.).
The goal in The Netherlands was that such a systemmust
be at least as secure and reliable as the existing remote vot-
ing system, which is based upon paper ballots that were
physically mailed. But such a justification must be made
based upon some kind of risk analysis, coupled with a cost
analysis, and an objective balance between risk and cost.
Unfortunately, in our experience, such an analysis rarely
takes place.
3.1. The Remote Voting Process
The entire KOA voting process is significantly under-
specified in public documentation and system specifica-
tions. The protocol is summarized here, and each glaring
problem with the correctness and/or security of the proto-
col is highlighted. Our intention is not to disparage this
particular protocol, but instead to highlight the fact that de-
signing such protocols, especially when they include human
and organizational agents, is extremely difficult and must be
carefully specified, verified, and analyzed for risk and cost,
prior to any system design and development takes place.
Protocol phase one: Voter registration and authenti-
cation. Voter registration is performed using a two-stage
process that relies upon physical mechanisms for voter reg-
istration and authentication.
To register their interest in using remote voting, a citizen
must physically visit a designated official government office
with official documentation (e.g., a passport) to prove that
they are a legitimate voter. At that time the voter chooses
a secret personal access code (hereafter known as the voter
PIN code) which is only known to the voter. This voter PIN
code is typed into a standard PIN keypad and is stored in
a database, associating the voter with his or her voter PIN
code.
Theoretically, only the voter knows his voter PIN code.
But as the voter PIN code is associated with the voter in
some database, and there is no information provided about
how that association is stored and protected, this is the
first place in the protocol where there is significant under-
specification and risk.
The protocol designates that a unique voter identification
code (hereafter known as the voter ID code) is created for
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the voter at some point in time, but it is unclear when this
step takes place. If it is only done later, when voting sheets
are generated and mailed to the voter (see below), then voter
privacy is violated.
It is also unclear in the current system design who is re-
sponsible for generating and recording voter ID codes. If
the voter ID code is generated by the appropriate agency
(i.e., the voting authority for this particular election) se-
curely when the voter registers, and that voter ID code is
used securely in the storage of the voter PIN code, and any
association between voter ID code and voter identity is de-
stroyed, then we (perhaps) have the foundation for a secure
authentication procedure in this voting process.
Voter ID code: 29835729
Vote date: 24 May 2007
Voting web site: http://evote.ie/
Web site SSL certificate data
Serial Number: 00 FC 38 A5 5C . . .
Country IE
State/Province Dublin
Organization Irish Election Authority
Common Name evote.ie
Email Address authorityevote.ie
Not Valid Before 10 January, 2007
Not Valid After 25 May 2007
MD5 Fingerprint A4 C7 E9 85 69 . . .
Table 1. Example Election Information Sheet
Some time later, a voter information packet is physically
mailed to the registered voter. This packet contains general
information about the election itself (date, time, etc.), and
also customized details that are provided only that specific
voter. An simplified example of such voter-customized de-
tails included in Table 1. These details include information
for voter authentication, including the aforementioned voter
ID code, but not his previously chosen voter PIN code.
Candidate District Code
Alice Jones Dublin 123456789
Bob Smith Dublin 246801234
Charlie O’Connor Wexford 293548723
Dermot O’Brian Wexford 395872983
Table 2. Example Candidate List
Also included in this information packet is a list of all
candidates running for an office in the current election. On
this sheet, a simplified example of which is in Table 2, each
candidate is assigned a different number, what is known as
a candidate ID code. Candidate ID codes are using during
voting, rather than candidate names, as discussed later.
The procedure used to generate candidate ID codes is
critical in this voting protocol. Candidate ID codes, which
are a kind of hash code, are generated by the voting au-
thority. Associated with each candidate is a set of uniquely
generated codes. For example, in the aforementioned EU
election in 2004, each candidate had ten unique candidate
ID codes. Each voter is given only one of these codes, and
only that particular code may be used by the voter during
the election. Therefore, election sheets may not be shared
between voters, and any observer that sees even a clear-text
ballot sent from a client to the voting server gains no infor-
mation about that ballot’s details.
Speculatively, it is possible to derive a perfect hash for a
given election, given the voting authority know the number
of candidates and the number of registered voters in a given
election. Such a unique set of codes guarantees that each
and every election information sheet is unique. If only a
small, finite number of candidate ID codes are generated
then it is possible that two election information sheets are
identical.
This is an example of a critical variance point in this pro-
tocol. What is the cost of generating more candidate codes?
Obviously, using only a single candidate ID code per can-
didate provides very little security. Intuitively, increasing
the number of candidate ID codes seems to increase the se-
curity of the voting stage of the protocol, but how is this
proposition verified? And furthermore, how many codes is
enough?
KOA is an excellent example of a scenario we see far
too often in the computing industry, and particularly in elec-
tronic voting systems: that of ad hoc systems design. Elec-
tronic voting is widely acknowledged as being a critical
software system. In classical critical systems design and de-
velopment industries like aerospace, transportation, bank-
ing, etc., systems are described at varying levels of detail us-
ing precise, formal notations. Likewise, protocols are care-
fully defined and verified using specialty tools like model
checkers.
In the KOA system, on the other hand, the voting proto-
col design seems very ad hoc—there is no known explicit
security and privacy requirements specification, there is no
risk analysis for the protocol, and critical design choices,
like using ten candidate ID codes for an EU election, are
seemingly pulled out of the air. There is no justification for
the design choices made, and there is no analysis that the
protocol used is correct or secure. Please refer to Figure 1
while reading the following summary of the KOA voting
protocol.
To vote, a registered voter connects to the web server
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Voter initiates 
connection to 
HTTPS website
Web browser presents site 
certificate which is confirmed 
by the voter by referencing 
their vote summary sheet
Web server 
presents a voter 
login page
Voter supplies 
identity code and 
access code
Web server denies access and 
logs failure if access code is 
not confirmed, otherwise the 
voting page is presented
For each election, voter enters 
the codes of the candidates for 
which they wish to vote 
Candidate codes are 
transferred via SSL to 
server which encrypts 
and stores the vote
Web server presents 
the voter with a 
transaction code
Figure 1. The KOA Vote Process
designated by a URL printed on the election information
sheet (recall Table 1). Communication with the voting web
site is secured with SSL. To ensure that the voter is com-
municating with the correct server, the metadata associated
with the SSL certificate for the voting site (e.g., information
about the site owner, the voting authority, the certificate is-
suer, certificate serial number, dates of validity, key finger-
prints, etc.) is printed on the election information sheet as
well. Thus, when the voter initially connects to the voting
website, the voter’s web browser challenges him to visually
inspect the site’s certificate, checking that its data conforms
to that which is printed on the election information sheet.
After confirming that they have connected to the correct
website, the voter authenticates with the web site with their
voter ID code and voter PIN code. They then step through a
series of simple web pages, typing in candidate codes as ap-
propriate for their candidate choices. The optionally system
responds by showing the voter the actual names and parties
of the candidates in question to confirm the accuracy of their
choice. This highlights another serious flaw in the current
system: the data sent to the server is obfuscated by virtue of
the fact that candidate ID codes are used, but any confirma-
tion of a voter’s choices is sent (in plain-text or not) over the
SSL channel, thereby potentially leaking a voters ballot to a
determined hacker (via a network sniff, man-in-the-middle
attack, or otherwise).
When a voter is done, a election transaction code is pro-
vided. The election transaction code is posted to a public
web-based bulletin board system so that the voter can later
check that the voter’s choices were included properly in the
final tally for the election. Unfortunately, given the cur-
rent system design and because a verifiable voting scheme
was not used, simply because a transaction code is printed
to the website does not guarantee that particular ballot was
counted.
All votes are, in the end, stored in a doubly-encrypted
fashion—each vote is encrypted by a symmetric key, per
voter, as well as the public key of the voting authority. Only
the appropriate voting officials have the corresponding pri-
vate key and know its passphrase, and thus only they can
initiate the ballot counting process. This highlights another
ad hoc flaw in the system: cryptography experts that have
reviewed KOA find no purpose for the symmetric per-voter
key.
In the Dutch EU election in 2004 the passphrase for this
key was meant to be known only to the sole individual re-
sponsible for the election. In fact, there was some fanfare
about it being held in a safe during the election. When the
time came though to count the ballots and the passphrase
was obtained from the safe, it was discovered that it was the
wrong passphrase—no one had activated the election public
key in use on the server and the test key that had been used
for months had been used in the real election!
Again, this kind of failure highlights the fact that certi-
fying an election procedure is about more than just ensur-
ing that the software system is of high quality or a com-
puter server (or even a key passphrase!) is in a locked
room. The entire voting process must be well-documented,
well-understood, and perfectly executed as complex proto-
col composed of hardware, software, and people-ware.
Additionally, since failures in various components and
their interactions are bound to happen, understanding the
implications of such are critical. When is a virtual ballot
spoiled? When exactly is a recount necessary? When must
the election be invalidated?
3.2. Evaluation of the KOA System
As highlighted, the KOA system, as it stood in 2003, was
not rigorously designed, engineered, tested, or deployed.
The SoS Group participated in two evaluations of this sys-
tem, not only to help improve its quality, but also to help
the evaluators and activists better understand its properties
so as to argue against its use.
A lightweight expert panel review. First, Prof. Jacobs
was part of an external expert panel that reviewed the sys-
tem’s high-level requirements and design, but performed no
review of the software. That panel wrote a report critical
of many aspects of the system and, as a result, many of the
panel’s recommendations were incorporated in the later ver-
sions of the system.
Three of the key recommendations were: 1) The sys-
tem must not be designed, implemented, tested, and admin-
istered by the same company. 2) The source code of the
system must be made available to any parties interested in
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reviewing the code. 3) The system must anonymously log
all raw data in the voting process so that an independent
recount is possible by any interested third party.
After this (extremely lightweight and dissatisfatory, at
least to the SoS Group members) evaluation took place, the
group did not expect to be further engaged with the process,
even though we were very interested in learning more and
challenging the system’s introduction.
A secret white hat network security review. Our next
involvement in the system came about because Prof. Jacobs
was notified that a secret/private demonstration of the KOA
system was to take place for the benefit of interested par-
ties in government. Example election information sheets
were produced and the KOA system was configured to run a
mock election. The SoS Group obtained one of these sheets
as well as the name of the machine that was running the
example voting server.
During the week of the test our group, led by the author,
conducted a gentle network analysis of the ISP hosting the
server, the subnet on which the server resided, and all ad-
jacent subnets. Additionally, we analyzed all systems on
these subnets, determining which operating system (type
and version) they were running, which network services
they had enabled, and their likely purpose.
On the final day of the test we attacked the site, executing
a small distributed denial-of-service attack. This brought
the site to a crawl and (obviously, purposefully) alerted the
authorities to our activities. We were told that the Dutch
Secret Service was called and various parties were quite ag-
itated until they determined the attack was coming from Ni-
jmegen, thus likely from white hats in Prof. Jacobs’s group.
Afterwards, the team responsible for the KOA system
were quite curious to hear our analysis. We made dozens
of recommendations in a report to the Ministry and nearly
all of these recommendations were adopted. In particular,
we highlighted the fact that test and development machines
must not be on the same subnet as the deployed server, all
servers must have only the voting service running and no
other (e.g., no mail server or secure shell server should be
running on the webserver during the election), and all sys-
tems must have the most up-to-date, and preferably the most
secure, operating systems installed.
A public white hat network security review. Next, the
Ministry requested that the SoS Group audit the remote vot-
ing system and attempt to break into, or otherwise disrupt, a
public trial vote that took place in late 2003. For a one week
period, much like we did previously, the group analyzed the
remote voting system’s network, servers, communication,
web site, etc., just as a black-hat hacker would do during
the actual vote.
This analysis and experience helped the system design-
ers and administrators learn how to react to a real-world
attack [16]. It also pointed out subtle network and physi-
cal attacks possible by determined hackers. In particular,
the SoS Group was, perhaps unsurprisingly, able to effect a
denial-of-service attack on the service with little effort. As a
result, the remote voting system was “tightened down” even
further and protocols, both technical and procedural, were
put in place to deal with denial-of-service attacks.
We must emphasize that, at this point in time, the source
code of the system and any of its detailed specifications tests
had still not been made available, even to the SoS Group
under an NDA.
Formally counting votes. The SoS Group also has be-
come directly involved in the implementation of a small but
critical part of the remote voting system. Due to recommen-
dation 1) above, the Ministry decided to open up a bid for
a third party construction of the ballot counting subsystem.
It is thought that if one or more third parties design and im-
plement the tally software in isolation, then the likelihood
of fraud in counting ballots is vanishingly small. The SoS
Group bid on this project and won it by virtue of our radi-
cal proposal: the ballot counting system would be formally
verified.
In early 2004, three members of the SoS Group (Dr. En-
gelbert Hubbers, Dr. Martijn Oostdijk, and the author) de-
signed, implemented, and verified a ballot counting sub-
system. Leveraging our past experience with verifica-
tion of Java, the vote counting system was constructed
in Java and specified with the Java Modeling Language
(JML) [17, 18]. The system was extensively tested, as thou-
sands of unit tests were generated with a tool called JMLu-
nit [3]. Additionally, key components were verified using
ESC/Java2, a static verification tool co-developed by the
SoS Group [1, 8]. As a result, we have very high confi-
dence in the correctness and accuracy of the vote counting
system [11, 15].
4. Voting Computers in Ireland
Several years ago the Irish government purchased hun-
dreds of Nedap voting computers for tens of millions Euro.
These machines needed some customization to work with
the Irish voting system, because, while the Dutch voting
system is list-based, the Irish system is a proportional rep-
resentation, single-transferable vote (PR-STV) system.
Additionally, software needed to be developed to per-
form election management, including election setup (iden-
tifying parties, candidates, districts, etc.), configure each
Nedap machine for an election, and perform an analysis of
election results, including the final ballot tally and election
report. This software was developed by a small, partly Irish
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company called Powervote, founded exclusively for this de-
velopment.
Over the past three years, multiple reviews of the ES3B
machines, the Powervote software, and a risk analysis were
conducted by the Commission on Electronic Voting (CEV),
producing several reports [25, 26].
In short, the end results of these extensive analyses is that
the CEV: 1) recommended the use of the Nedap hardware
for future use in Ireland, subject to a number of recommen-
dations, foremost of which is the introduction of a voter-
verifiable (paper) audit trail [VV(P)AT], and 2) could not
recommend the use of the election management software
due to serious problems with its quality and correctness.
Unfortunately, the Powervote software has never been
made public, nor has any of the Nedap hardware or soft-
ware. Recently, activists analyzed and hacked the Nedap
machines in question, raising additional questions not ad-
dressed in detail in the CEV reports [9].
It is important to note that, even were the full voting sys-
tem’s source code released to the public, as has been done
in The Netherlands, it is not only the election software that
must be verified. It is much more important to verify the
election procedure and run a verifiable election.
Additionally, the citizens participating in an election
must have trust in the election procedure, which includes a
trust in all of the subcomponents and subsystems of an elec-
tion: the election officials, observers, electronic and non-
electronic equipment, security (e.g., police in Ireland, inde-
pendent security personnel in The Netherlands), media, etc.
In other words, Open Source Software is not enough: an
Open Voting Process is mandatory.
5. Where Ireland and The Netherlands Meet
What brings Ireland and The Netherlands together is
more than just their their choice of voting computers, as
both are heavily invested in Nedap hardware. Additionally,
for example, they are both relatively small countries with re-
spect to geography and population. Thus, one would hope
that the two governments learn from each others’ experi-
ences, and perhaps even work together to better understand
and solve the challenges of elections, with or without the
use of electronic voting equipment.
But there are also a number of critical differences be-
tween the two countries and their citizens, differences that
significantly impact on the adoption of electronic voting.
Furthermore, these differences make it unlikely that they
will work together to solve their joint problems in electronic
voting.
For example, citizens’ trust in government varies dra-
matically. Dutch citizens seem to trust their government
and its officials significantly more than Irish citizens trust
their officials. Thus, a risk analysis in The Netherlands will
be biased by this perception difference. Likewise, a formal
analysis of the election process which incorporates human
agents (particularly election officials and voters) must take
into account this difference.
Second, The Netherlands is very technically modern so-
ciety. Electronic cash is widely used, one can pay for buses
and trains with “Chip and PIN” smart-cards, all government
services and banks are available online, the public trans-
portation system is very efficient and reliable, etc. Ireland
is quite to the contrary: credit cards are not even widely
used, let alone any kind of electronic cash-based system,
one may only pay for local public transport with cash, very
few government services are available online, etc. Thus,
in some sense, The Netherlands is more able to rationally
adopt technological solutions to the public’s problems, elec-
tions or not.
Nedap’s corporate behavior has, thus far, also varied
greatly between the two countries. To date, Nedap officials
have been quite conciliatory to Irish officials (see the re-
sponses from Nedap and Powervote in the Appendices of
the CEV reports), whereas they have recently been very
threatening to Dutch officials (see the Dutch electronic vot-
ing activists website [6]).
Additionally, the two governments differ dramatically in
their openness. For example, only through the hard work
and great cost of Irish citizen activists, primarily through
Freedom of Information requests, has any information at all
about electronic voting in Ireland become public [10].
Even though the Dutch government is more open and
seemingly more rational than the Irish government, poor de-
cisions are still made. For example, recently, on the demand
of the Dutch government, a VVPAT solution was added to
Nedap machines and demonstrated in The Netherlands. Un-
fortunately, the precise solution that they have chosen to
implement, a scroll-based ballot printout being a glass win-
dow, is widely regarded as perhaps the worst realization of
VVPAT.
So the situation is: 1) nearly all electronic voting systems
adopted by governments are proprietary, 2) most computer
scientists and mathematicians are not aware of the multi-
tude of interesting problems (algorithmic, computational,
mathematical, etc.) inherent in electronic voting systems,
and 3) we need a simple, concrete way to educate scientists,
government officials, and normal citizens about the prob-
lems, challenges, and good solutions in electronic voting.
Thus, in response to these needs, our research group
has adopted and extended the (incomplete, ill-documented,
non-working) KOA electronic voting system for the pur-
pose of providing a concrete, high-quality technical founda-
tion for, quite broadly, international collaborative research
in electronic voting systems.
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6. A Platform for Electronic Voting Research
The KOA system is described in detail in several papers
and theses [4, 7, 14, 20, 27], thus we will not attempt to de-
scribe the system in full detail here. The system, including
all system description and requirements [19], source code,
formal specifications, open problem descriptions, etc. is
available via our research group’s website [13]. This plat-
form is meant to provide a foundation for tackling many of
the problems elucidated in critical studies like the SERVE
report [12].
As mentioned previously, the KOA system was used for
a remote voting experiment, voting over the telephone and
Internet, in 2004. But the software architecture is not spe-
cific to remote voting; it is a perfectly acceptable foundation
for a kiosk-based or polling place-based electronic voting
system.
The KOA system released by the Dutch government was
seriously incomplete. It was a partial snapshot of (only) the
source code of the system—the system did not compile, ap-
proximately 10% of the system was missing due to intellec-
tual property claims, it was tied to a proprietary foundation
(a commercial Enterprise Java technology), and it contained
no high-level documentation and very few tests.
Our group, working with others, have resolved these
issues. We have reverse engineered the missing pieces,
rewritten the system to work on an entirely Open Source
foundation (primarily Enterprise Java and database tech-
nologies), written new subsystems (e.g., a formally speci-
fied and verified implementation of the Irish PR-STV voting
system), and translated to English much of the documenta-
tion we eventually received from the Dutch government.
The main subsystems missing at this point in time are:
• VVPAT subsystem
We have not built a subsystem for experimenting with
different forms and processes of voter-verifiable (pa-
per) audit trails. Of particular interest are concrete,
scientific HCI experiments with different VVPAT so-
lutions.
• non-web-based voting interface
The primary interface to the system is via a web
browser, which is a very simple, but perhaps to too
heavyweight and overly complex front-end. Election
setup, voting, and election reporting are conducted via
a web browser interacting with the server software, but
the formally specified vote counting system is imple-
mented with a Java Swing-based interface.
• formal specification of the full voting process
Only specific subsystems, particularly the Dutch and
Irish tally subsystems, are formally specified at this
time. A variety of other subsystems must be specified
to completely understand and reason about the full sys-
tem. It is not even clear how to couch such specifica-
tions, which formal foundation to use, or which aspects
of the problem to focus upon first.
• analysis of the remote voting protocol
The protocol used in the Dutch elections, as realized in
the current system, has not been formally specified or
critically analyzed in any fashion. The creation of new
distributed systems protocols, particularly with the use
of cryptography, is incredibly difficult. New protocols
must have formal specifications be formally verified
before they are implemented.
• risk and cost analysis of the system
No risk or cost analysis, or even a proposed model
or framework for such, exists for the KOA system.
There are many excellent collaboration opportunities
for this kind of work, perhaps between a systems-
or verification-centric computer scientist, a cryptogra-
pher, and an economist.
• trustworthy voting system
The currently specified and verified voting systems re-
alized in KOA are not trustworthy voting systems. In-
corporating such a system, like those of Chaum, Ryan,
and Schneider (e.g., Preˆt a` Voter) [2, 21, 22, 23, 24],
especially if it is formally specified and verified, is an
excellent research opportunity.
As is clear, there are many open scientific and engineer-
ing opportunities in electronic voting that may be concretely
realized and critically analyzed in the KOA system.
7. . . . But Still Only Trusting Paper
Regardless of the existence of this high-quality exper-
imental foundation for electronic voting research, there is
still far too many serious open problems to identify and
solve before electronic voting is adopted for any serious lo-
cal or national election. As mentioned before, Open Source
Software is not enough, an Open Voting Process is manda-
tory.
In the end, physical (perhaps paper) ballots are the bal-
lots. Digital ballots are only a “shadow” of the physical bal-
lot. It is extremely difficult to ensure that digital artifacts are
not copied, manipulated, and destroyed—exactly the kinds
of manipulations we do not wish ballots to permit. Even
advanced so-called “Digital Rights Management” (DRM)
systems that the entertainment industries have promulgated
are no match for a determined adversary interested in steal-
ing a song, let alone a determined group of political activists
interested in stealing an election.
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Only after completing the open tasks summarized in the
previous section, and experimenting with a variety of forms
of physical ballots and verifiable voting systems, can we
begin to make a rational decision about the introduction of
electronic voting in a major election.
8. Conclusions
In our experience, Dutch government representatives re-
sponsible for electronic voting systems, remote or not, have
a “nothing to hide” attitude and are open to new ideas
and external review. They also have a healthy distance to-
ward the supplier of the system; even after spending signif-
icant funds on building and testing the system, because SoS
Group and others found non-trivial flaws in the system’s de-
sign and implementation, the project was immediately sus-
pended.
The situation is Ireland is dramatically different. Even
after the detailed involvement over several years of dozens
of experts, generating hundreds of pages of high-quality
reports and reflections on the system, the current govern-
ment officials, particularly the Taoiseach (Prime Minister),
Mr. Bertie Ahern, and the Minister currently responsible
for the electronic voting hardware, Mr. Martin Cullen, still
claim that the system is fit for use and Ireland’s lack of
adoption of electronic voting machines is, in fact, the op-
position’s fault.
In fact, only in the first week of May 2007, four years af-
ter machines were purchased, did the Minister finally admit
that the government might have made a mistake in purchas-
ing equipment before consulting with experts:
I suppose with hindsight, yes, I might have dealt
with it differently ...
I suppose if I was to go back, I would have said
let’s do another testing phase in the next election
rather than moving it into full use immediately,
but there isn’t a person yet who hasn’t made a
mistake on things, and if that’s a mistake, I put
my hands up.
-Mr. Martin Cullen, on the Irish government’s
adoption process for electronic voting
Unfortunately, the Taoiseach still refuses to acknowledge
the truth of the current situation. As reported in late April,
2007 in the national media [5]:
The Taoiseach has told the Da´il he was embar-
rassed by the fact the we did not have an elec-
tronic voting system when he watched the French
election results come in within two hours.
He said he apologised to the people of Meath
where he had been visiting at the time, and said in
a technologically advanced country we were go-
ing back to the ‘peann luaidhe’.
Mr Ahern said that with ‘a bit of luck’ our elec-
tion would be finished within five days.
The Taoiseach blamed the Opposition for the
electronic voting machines lying unused and said
if they had not played politics with the issue we
would not be the laughing stock of Europe.
He said if they had taken a mature attitude to a
voting system which had worked, we would have
electronic voting and it was a disgrace.
Labour Party leader, Pat Rabbitte criticised the
62m Euro overspend on electronic voting ma-
chines. He said this Government had presided
over huge waste and the Comptroller and Audi-
tor General had estimated that the cost of storing
these machines was about 1m Euro a year.
Regardless of these statements, the Irish government is
not using computers in the upcoming election on the 24th
of May. But this situation may change, regardless the con-
tinued effort of activists, scientists, and activist scientists.
Governments, like any other large group, do not necessarily
exhibit rational behavior.
It is in this atmosphere that our work on the KOA system
continues. This system represents a high-quality foundation
for performing experiments in electronic voting. It is hoped
that, by elucidating the complex conflicting challenges in-
herent in voting, more computer scientists and mathemati-
cians will become involved in electronic voting research.
But, while we have a high degree of confidence in this
experimental system, particularly with regards to our por-
tions written and verified by our groups with formal meth-
ods, there are still open issues that must be addressed prior
to the adoption of electronic voting in any serious venue.
Foremost among these issues is our contention that all
of the software used in an electronic voting system must be
made Open Source. KOA represents a nearly unique sit-
uation because, unlike many similar electronic and remote
voting systems developed for governments, the Dutch gov-
ernment owned the program code of the KOA system. Thus,
there were no corporate claims of ownership or secrecy on
the program code. It was only due to this ownership situa-
tion, coupled with the Dutch government’s honest desire for
openness, that nearly the entire KOA system was released
in July of 2004 under the GPLv2 Open Source license.
Surprisingly, until very recently, mainstream press has
only barely picked up on this major event and further devel-
opments on KOA. The primary Dutch website dedicated to
Open Source software has covered the story well. To learn
more about the original release of the KOA system, see the
Ministry’s own web pages and OSOSS.nl’s continued cov-
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erage. To learn more about the new KOAv2 release, see our
research group’s website [13].
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